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Abstract 
 
It is often argued by politicians and reporters alike, that democratizing candidate selection 
procedures would lead to greater political participation and interest in politics, stronger 
sense of satisfaction with and support for democracy, and higher levels of confidence/trust 
with democracy. Yet, to date no systematic comparative analysis was conducted to test the 
hypothesized effects of democratizing selection procedures on citizens' views on democracy. 
In this paper we use a cross-national hierarchical analysis to examine whether open and 
democratized selection processes are associated with positive views on democracy. We use 
numerous public opinion surveys such as the CSES, and the World Values Survey to measure 
citizens' perceptions and views about democracy, as well as their level of participation, and 
our data contains information on about 300 parties' candidate selection procedures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
Introduction 
"Likud members are the best arranging committee we have, and they are the 
ones who are going to select the Likud list for the next Knesset. One of the main 
problems in the current Knesset is that about 80 Knesset Members were not 
selected in democratic selections and they have almost no responsiveness to the 
public but rather to the person or rabbi that nominated them. Likud cannot make 
others' mistakes." (MK Ardan, Ynet, 15/11/2007) 
 
This paper examines the effect of democratizing intraparty candidate selection methods on 
citizens’ political attitudes. Based on a cross-national comparative dataset about candidate 
selection methods of parties, we analyze the effect of inclusiveness and decentralization on 
levels of political interest and trust in parliament of citizens. 
Democratic political culture is a crucial asset for democratic political systems. A long 
tradition in political science research, started by the seminal work of Almond and Verba 
(1963), has demonstrated that representative democracy works better if there is a level of 
trust in political institutions, if citizens are genuinely interested in political affairs and are 
satisfied with the democratic process in their country. Over the years, political attitudes of 
citizens and its determinants has drawn considerable research attention (Anderson and 
Guillory 1997, Clarke and Acock 1989).  
The majority of studies on this topic disentangle a number of macro-level institutional 
determinants of political attitudes, such as the electoral system, economic performance and 
perceived corruption levels. In addition, authors always tend to control for a number of 
4 
 
individual-level determinants such as gender, age, education and income. What remains to 
be under-researched, however, is the impact of political parties on citizens’ views on 
democracy and politics.  
Parties constitute the meso-level in representative democracies: they are indispensable 
institutions for the linkage between state and society, and should not remain absent in any 
comparative analysis of political attitudes of citizens. It is often argued that political parties 
could actively increase political interest and participatory levels by democratizing candidate 
or leadership selection procedures and giving members and citizens a voice in the political 
recruitment process (Shapira et al., 2010). By giving them access to internal decision-making 
procedures, parties will activate a more democratic attitude among citizens. Democratizing 
selection processes, and especially adopting primaries will increase participation, strengthen 
competitiveness and improve representation, as parliament members will be responsive and 
accountable to the wider selectorate who voted for them (Kenig, 2012). In essence, it has 
been argued that there is a strong relationship between intra-party democracy and external 
democracy (Shapira et al., 2010). In this manner, parties could perform the role of 
democratic attitude-promoters, which would be a strong argument in favor of 
democratically organized political parties. 
In this paper, we examine if this claim about democratizing parties and their voters holds 
true. We investigate whether the citizens of countries with more democratic candidate 
selection methods have more positive attitudes towards democracy and are generally more 
interested in politics.  
For this draft of the paper, we estimated two level varying intercept hierarchical models with 
political interest and trust in parliament as outcome variables. The analysis is based on a 
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cross-national comparative dataset containing information on about 300 parties’ candidate 
selection methods from 67 different parliamentary sessions worldwide. We use various 
cross-national public opinion surveys (CSES, WVS, EVS, Afrobarometer, Latino Barometro 
and ESS) to measure citizens’ views and attitudes about politics and democracy. 
In the next part of the paper, we summarize the most important explanatory factors of 
citizens’ political attitudes mentioned in the literature. Subsequently, we focus on the role of 
political parties in this story. The literature on party decline and innovation mentions that 
parties with declining membership figures often turn to internal democratization to 
revitalize levels of trust and political interest (Scarrow et al., 2000; Leduc, 2001). We link this 
claim with the literature on candidate selection methods and argue how the inclusiveness of 
the selectorate and the level of decentralization are expected to influence political attitudes. 
Afterwards, the cross-national data on both candidate selection methods and political 
attitudes and the hierarchical nature of the data will be presented. The section on results 
discusses the estimated hierarchical models with political interest and trust in parliament as 
response variables. The concluding part puts these results into theoretical perspective and 
summarizes future directions of this project. 
 
Determinants of citizens’ political attitudes 
In the literature on political culture, a general consensus exists that ‘democratic’ attitudes of 
citizens and the national political culture are quintessential elements for any democratic 
system (Geissel, 2008). The democratic nature of countries is not only determined by 
democratically organized institutional models, but also by the specific attitudes of its citizens 
towards democracy and politics in general. 
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While debates on this subject are probably older than political science itself, the empirical 
research tradition on political culture started flourishing in the 1960s with the work of 
Almond and Verba (1963). Their argument that political support is one of the necessary 
prerequisites for the stability of democracy has given rise to an extensive stream of research 
on citizen’s attitudes and the relation between institutional structures and political culture. 
The resulting literature has focused on a multitude of concepts and indicators of political 
attitudes: political interest, satisfaction with democracy, internal and external political 
efficacy, political trust in various representative institutions, political participation and 
support for democracy have all been addressed comprehensively. Although dealing with 
different outcome variables, previous studies all have in common that they primarily focus 
on the effects of country-level determinants when explaining cross-national variation in 
political attitudes. Additionally, individual characteristics of respondents are usually also 
included as important predictors of citizens’ views on democracy. In what follows, we 
summarize the most frequently cited macro- and micro-level determinants of citizens’ 
attitudes. 
 
The macro-level: institutional and economic determinants 
Of all the institutional aspects believed to impact democratic attitudes, the electoral system 
has probably received the highest amount of research attention. It appears there are several 
mechanisms at work which might affect citizens' democratic attitudes all related to electoral 
systems. To begin with, systems of proportional representation have more potential for 
increasing citizen involvement in politics as they include more social groups, which in turn 
leads to higher levels of political efficacy, turnout and regime support (Blais and Dobrzynska, 
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1996; Anderson, 1998). Proportional systems facilitate representation and avoid the wasted 
vote occurrences common in more disproportional majoritarian systems.  The 
disproportionality in majoritarian systems when translating votes into seats distribution may 
discourage or even alienate specific groups (Bowler et al., 1994). However, other authors 
find no positive association between the number of represented political parties and efficacy 
and contest the positive effect of PR systems on democratic attitudes (Karp and Banducci, 
2008). 
District magnitude may also affect democratic attitudes. When M is low (M=1), voters feel 
they are directly represented by a legislator who cares for and cater to them. Accountability 
levels are also high. On the other hand, as M grows voters cease to identify with a sole 
representative and the ability to hold politicians accountable becomes more blurred. Hence 
one might anticipate levels of trust and political interest to decrease as district magnitude 
increases. Yet, in very high levels of district magnitude the electoral map is characterized by 
high effective numbers of parties that compete energetically in the electoral arena. This 
intensified competition coupled with increased sense of representation may boosts citizens' 
interest in the political process and affect their levels of trust.        
Apart from the electoral system, other country level predictors come into play as well. The 
age of democratic systems has an impact on the level of satisfaction with democracy (Aarts 
and Thomassen, 2008). Older democracies will enjoy higher levels of trust and interest 
compared to new democracies. Additionally, the level of corruption has been found to 
influence various forms of political attitudes (Anderson and Tverdova, 2003). Similarly, 
economic performance has been linked to citizens’ political attitudes (Wagner et al., 2009; 
Paskeviciute and Anderson, 2006). Analogous to voting behavior, attitudes on democracy 
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and the political system are indeed also influenced by the economic situation, usually 
measured in terms of inflation, unemployment rate and GDP growth. 
The micro-level: individual determinants 
Although country-level determinants account for the largest part of variability in cross-
national analyses of political attitudes, individual characteristics of citizens matters as well. 
Besides the usual independent variables such as age and gender, the literature has 
repeatedly stressed the importance of political sophistication and educational level for 
forming political attitudes (Niemi et al., 1991; Dalton, 2008). Furthermore, the degree of 
party identification is positively associated with support for political parties (Holmberg, 
2003). 
What about parties? 
As mentioned in the introduction of this paper, the impact of the political party-level has not 
been dealt with in the large majority of studies on political attitudes. The existing literature 
largely ignores the fact that political parties vary in their behavior and electoral strategies, 
and that party members and supporters might be affected by these interparty-differences.  
One of the notable exceptions to this is the work of Paskeviciute and Anderson (2003), who 
linked citizens to parties and differentiated those parties on the basis of their goals. Their 
results show that the level of support for the political system in general, and political parties 
as political institutions strongly varies according to party type. Another study of Anderson 
(1998) has examined the impact of party and party system performance in mobilizing 
member support on satisfaction with democracy. He found that party performance was the 
best indicator of differences in satisfaction across democracies. 
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But what about other characteristics such as the internal organization of political parties? 
Authors have largely neglected to empirically test this type of party-level determinants while 
studying political attitudes of citizens. This is surprising, since the literature on intraparty 
democracy often implicitly refers to the possible effects of intra-party democratization on 
levels of participation, trust in parties, and other forms of democratic attitudes. In what 
follows, we review this literature and formulate a number of hypotheses about the effects of 
intra-party democracy on citizens’ attitudes. 
 
Intra-party democratization and its consequences 
Political parties are often portrayed as being in decline. This is then illustrated by decreasing 
levels of trust in parties and party membership decline in the majority of representative 
democracies (Van Biezen et al., 2012). As a result, parties are increasingly losing touch with 
society, which could have far-reaching consequences for their legitimacy in general, and 
some of their crucial roles in particular, such as elite recruitment and interest articulation 
(Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000). 
Parties have experimented with several remedies to bend this negative trend. One of those 
remedies is to democratize internal decision-making procedures, for example by opening up 
candidate selection processes to wider selectorates and by adopting membership votes for 
choosing party leaders (Scarrow et al., 2000; Leduc, 2001). These reforms were designed to 
bring citizens back in the political process by increasing responsiveness, transparency and 
party membership appeal (Cross, 1996; Scarrow, 1996).  
10 
 
Indeed, one of the more positive pictures of political parties in representative democracies is 
that these organizations are able to enhance the interest and participation of citizens. Party 
democratization is a way to give party members and voters an opportunity to have a voice 
(Hirschmann, 1970). This might be a plausible explanation for the increasing number of 
democratic intra-party reforms (Scarrow, 1996). Of course, parties may sometimes have 
other reasons to undertake these reforms, such as severe electoral defeat (Hopkin, 2001; 
Pennings and Hazan, 2001).  
In  sum, the literature suggests that democratizing intra-party decision-making such as party 
leadership and candidate selection would lead to politically more involved and activated 
citizens. However, this claim has not yet been systematically tested on the basis of 
comparative data on party procedures and citizen’s views on democracy. 
A reading of the existing empirical research on the effects of party democratization does not 
exactly give rise to optimism. On the contrary, several scholars argue that intra-party 
democratization efforts often do not lead to the desired effects. For instance, democratic 
changes in party leadership selection has not been found to have a positive effect on 
political participation, nor did it lead to higher levels of competition among candidates (Carty 
and Blake, 1999; Kenig, 2009). Furthermore, the representativeness of parties towards their 
voters is lower in candidate selection procedures with more inclusive selectorates (Spies and 
Kaiser, 2014). Finally, Rahat et al. (2008) find that internally democratic parties produce 
candidate lists that are less representative. 
Another group of scholars pointed out that party democratization might even have a 
number of negative consequences for party stability and democratic regimes in general. A 
well-known claim in this respect is that party elites who appear to open up their procedures 
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for members and voters, in fact try to manipulate intra-party democracy for their own ends 
(Marsh, 1993; Mair, 1994). In addition, it has been well-documented that inclusive candidate 
selection procedures may lead to lower levels of party cohesion, endangering government 
and parliamentary stability (Hazan and Rahat, 2006; Rahat, 2007). 
As a consequence, we also have reasons to be skeptical about the alleged positive effects of 
party democratization on democratic attitudes of citizens. Is it actually the case that 
democratic decision-making procedures lead to more positive views towards democracy in 
society? In the next section, we focus on the main explanatory variable of this paper, intra-
party candidate selection methods, and discuss its possible effects on citizen’s attitudes. 
 
Hypothesized effects of candidate selection methods on citizens’ attitudes 
Recruitment and selection of political elites is one of the most important activities and 
responsibilities of political parties. As a consequence, it is not surprising that party scholars 
have produced a great deal of literature on various aspects of this topic.  
The evolution of candidate selection methods has been studied extensively, both in single-
country and cross-national studies (e.g.  Gallagher and Marsh, 1988; Bille, 2001; Siavelis and 
Morgenstern, 2008). The most useful analytical framework for a comparative analysis of 
these methods has been developed by Hazan and Rahat (2001; 2010). Their model 
disentangles four dimensions of candidate selection, among which decentralization and 
inclusiveness of the selectorate are the most important ones.  
The selectorate, on the one hand, is the body that selects the candidates, and can be 
composed of only one person, or several people, up to the entire electorate of the nation. 
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This dimension can be measured on a continuum from exclusive selectorates, where a very 
limited group of selectors take control, to inclusive selectorates, such as the party members 
or the electorate. Decentralization, on the other hand, measures the influence of local party 
branches in the candidate selection. In highly centralized methods, the national party level 
has complete control over the nomination process. 
To our knowledge, there has been only very little research interest for the effects of 
candidate selection methods on citizen’s attitudes. Is it the case that voters of parties with 
inclusive candidate selection methods have more positive views towards democracy than 
voters of parties with exclusive methods? A comparable question has been posed by Norell 
(2008), who found that party democratization has a positive effect on voter turnout and 
satisfaction with democracy in European elections. Moreover, there is some evidence that 
open primary elections lead to higher voter turnout (Calcagno and Westley, 2008; Clausen, 
2009). 
In line with these findings, one could expect democratic candidate selection methods to 
enhance democratic attitudes such as political interest, trust in political institutions and 
satisfaction with democracy. Arguably, especially selection methods with highly inclusive and 
decentralized selectorates could be considered as democratic institutions. If parties allow 
party members and even the general electorate to participate in the nomination of 
candidates for parliamentary elections, this might have various effects on these members’ 
and voters’ democratic attitudes. First, since they have the opportunity to participate and 
influence important intra-party decisions, they will be more inclined to read up on current 
events and consequently be more interested in politics. Second, political parties signaling 
that members and voters are welcome to voice their opinion in intra-party matters, open the 
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‘black box’ and arguably increase transparency and accountability, which might in turn 
increase trust in political parties, and moreover in other political institutions structured and 
formed by parties such as government and parliament. Third and finally, inclusive candidate 
selection methods might also improve other attitudes such as satisfaction with democracy 
and political efficacy, since involvement in intra-party decision-making make voters believe 
that their opinion matters for the outcome of selection processes and elections. Hence, our 
first hypothesis states: 
H1. Inclusive candidate selection methods lead to more democratic 
attitudes among citizens. 
The effect of the second dimension, decentralization, appears to be less straightforward. As 
mentioned earlier, this dimension describes the party level that is in control of the candidate 
selection process and has less to do with the level of democratization within parties. Still, 
one might expect that decentralization matters for levels of political support and trust in 
political institutions. If candidate selection processes are strongly decentralized, voters may 
feel more closely involved in intraparty decision-making than in nationally organized 
candidate selection methods. As selection takes place with a decentralized mechanism, 
voters might feel their own local geographic interests are being preserved compared to 
selection processes which take place at a national level, which are by definition more remote 
from the voters themselves. Thus, if the local party leader completely controls who gets 
nominated, this would still result in more confidence in political parties and democracy in 
general compared to total domination by the distant national party leader. As a result, we 
expect that: 
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H2. Decentralized candidate selection methods lead to more 
democratic attitudes among citizens. 
 
Data and method 
We built a cross-national dataset on the political attitudes of 127,146 citizens in 67 
parliamentary country sessions (see Appendix for more details). More specifically, we 
collected data on six different political attitudes: (1) interest in politics, (2) trust in 
government, (3) trust in political parties (4), trust in parliament, (5) support for democracy, 
and (6) satisfaction with democracy (in the current draft of the paper we present results for 
the interest in politics and trust in parliament outcome variables). Samples were derived 
from numerous cross-national public opinion surveys, complemented by a smaller number 
of national election studies.  
Data on intra-party candidate selection processes is scarce. Finding surveys that correspond 
(in terms of countries and years) to the parties for which we were able to collect selection 
data was difficult. As is evident from the appendix, not all outcome variables are feasible for 
all country-sessions. Hence for each outcome variable we end up with a different sample of 
parties and country-sessions. However, as the selection of cases into the analysis is not 
correlated with either the outcome variable or any of the predictors, we are confident the 
results we obtain are not biased by the difficulties of selecting cases. Moreover, some of the 
key control variables we wished to account for were simply not asked by many surveys and 
would have resulted in a dramatic reduction of the sample size in both the individual as well 
as the country-session levels (for example control for a country's corruption levels or 
respondent's education). We therefore chose not to include these control variable in the 
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main models, and check their effect and whether they alter the main predictors' (candidate 
selection) effect, with the more limited datasets.    
For all of the outcome variables, the data were recoded to a four point ordinal scale 
comparable to the ones used in the World Values Survey and European Values Study for 
measuring these attitudes (for Interest in Politics, for example: ‘How interested would you 
say you are in politics?’ 1. Very interested; 2. Somewhat/fairly interested; 3. Not very 
interested; 4. Not at all interested.  For ease of interpretation we recoded the scale such that 
lower numbers mean lower levels of interest. For the operationalization of the other 
outcome variables, see Appendix). All samples contained individual level data on the sex (0 = 
male, 1 = female) and age (continuous) of respondents. For a subset of the cases we also 
included educational level that was recoded to an ordinal variable with five categories (1 = 
no education (not finished at least primary education); 2 = finished primary education; 3 = 
finished secondary education; 4 = started higher education but did not finish; 5 = university 
degree). 
The operationalization of the key independent variables needs some additional explanation. 
The inclusiveness of the selectorate is operationalized as an ordinal variable with three 
categories: 0 = small group of party leaders; 1 = party delegates; 2 = primaries. The 
dimension of decentralization is measured similarly with 0 = national candidate selection; 1 = 
local candidate selection with national control or veto; 2 = local selection without national 
interference.4 
                                                             
4 Additionally, we also checked for the effect of an integrated selection variable which amalgamates 
inclusiveness and decentralization: 1 = national party leadership up to 10 selectors; 2 = national party 
delegates; 3 = local party leadership up to 10 selectors, subject to approval of the national party (veto or 
adding); 4 = local party leadership up to 10 selectors; 5 = local party delegates subject to approval of national 
party (veto or adding); 6 = local party delegates; 7 = primaries subject to approval of national party; 8 = 
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Key independent variables at the country-session level were operationalized as follows. We 
use various indicators to control for the potential effect of electoral systems on political 
attitudes. To begin with, we control for the average district magnitude, where a country's 
average is a weighted average of the various district magnitudes, with weights determined 
by how many legislators run in districts of each size. Additionally, we control for electoral 
system type using Lundell and Karvonen's (2003) classification in their comparative dataset 
on political institutions. Following their operationalization, we distinguish six categories of 
electoral systems: 1 = closed party lists; 2 = systems with single-member districts; 3 = mixed 
systems; 4 = Strong preferential voting systems; 5 = Weak preferential voting systems; 6 = 
No vote pool at party level systems.5 Lastly, the Gallagher-index is used as an index of 
disproportionality between the allocation of votes versus seats.  
In addition to electoral systems we also control for other country-level predictors. For 
example, we created a binary variable ‘new democracy’, which indicates which countries are 
less than 20 years considered ‘free’ according to Freedom House. Countries with over 20 
years of uninterrupted freedom are then considered old democracies. This cut-off point has 
previously been applied by Karp and Banducci (2007). Finally, we used the GDP per capita to 
account for economic development.  
In order to estimate the effect of institutional determinants and selection procedures on the 
attitudes of citizens, we first needed to make sure that the surveys were taken after the 
election (for which the selection of candidates took place) and the start of the parliamentary 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
primaries (see also: Shomer, 2009). Furthermore, we also checked for the effect of selection procedures by 
creating a dummy variable for primaries versus the rest.  See the results section for fuller discussion.  
5 We substituted the electoral type variable with other operationalizations such as an 8 categories electoral 
system variable ( 1= CLPR, 2= PLPR+ weak preferential, 3= OLPR, 4=SMD, 5=alternative vote, 6= single non 
transferable vote, 7=single transferable vote, and 8- mixed member systems), as well as a dichotomous variable 
that differentiates between proportional electoral systems to none-proportional systems, The substantive 
results remained largely the same to the ones presented in the paper.   
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term. At that moment, candidate selection procedures already took place and survey 
respondents’ attitudes could have been influenced by it.  
Ideally, we would have liked to create a 3 level hierarchical model whereby respondents are 
nested within the parties for which they voted in the elections, and in turn these parties are 
nested within country-sessions. The key predictors in the analysis - selectorate and 
decentralization - would have then been estimated in their appropriate party level. 
However, in order to link respondents to specific parties the surveys should have contained 
items about party preferences. In the public opinion surveys used for this paper, we 
discovered only two questionnaire items of this kind. First, the Comparative Study of 
Electoral Systems (CSES) and European Social Survey (ESS) asked their respondents “What 
party list did you vote for?”. With this question, we would have been able to nest 
respondents correctly to political parties and their selection procedures. Unfortunately, only 
the two abovementioned surveys have worked with this item, which covers only a limited 
number of parties and parliamentary country-sessions in our dataset. Using this technique 
would have reduced our sample size drastically and render our research goals impossible.  
Second, other surveys, such as the World Values Survey (WVS), European Values Study (EVS), 
Afrobarometer and Latin Barometer asked the more hypothetical version of this question, “If 
there were an election tomorrow, which party would you vote for?”. This question does not 
give absolute certainty about the respondents’ voting behavior in the previous election. 
Voters could of course have switched their party preferences in the time between the 
previous election and the timing of the survey questionnaire. To minimize this risk, we would 
only have to work with surveys that were taken within two years after the election took 
place. Nonetheless, even if we use both operationalizations of party preferences to correctly 
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nest respondents within their respective parties, our sample size would have reduced 
drastically (for example, about 20,000 respondents for the political interest model) and 
results become unreliable.  
We therefore chose to estimate a 2-level model whereby citizens are nested within country 
sessions. To further support this decision we note that there is only a small variation within 
each country-session with regards to candidate selection processes. For example, 27 out of 
46 country-sessions in the political interest model witnessed no variation in their parties' 
candidate selection processes, and this number was 32 out of 55 country-sessions in the 
trust in parliament model. Similarly, for the trust in parliament model 33 country-sessions 
out of the 55 we have data for, witnessed no variation in levels of decentralization and 40 
out of 55 witnessed no variation in parties' selectorate. In light of this limited within country-
session variation in our key predictors, and due to the data availability problems we listed 
above we have chosen to estimate a 2 level varying intercept model.     
In the 2 level models, we pooled all the survey respondents per parliamentary session. We 
use two different operationalization to aggregate candidate selection procedures from the 
party to the country-session level. First, we calculated weighted averages of candidate 
selection procedures used by the political parties in this parliamentary session. More 
specifically, we used the parliamentary seat share of each party as a weight when calculating 
the average selection procedure in that parliament.6 Alternatively, we used the modal 
category of both candidate selection dimensions and checked if we found any substantial 
differences in the results. 
 
                                                             
6 For instance, if Party A has a score of 3 on the inclusiveness scale and has a seat share of 40% in parliament, 
and Party B has a score of 1 with a seat share of 60% then the average inclusiveness is 1.8 (3*0.4+1*0.6=1.8). 
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Results 
Table 1 presents the results of the 2 level HLM models in which individual respondents are 
nested within country-sessions.7 The first model presents the results with regard to 
respondents' levels of political interest and the second model presents the results of the 
trust in parliament analysis. From calculation of the ICC measure we have found that 13% of 
the variance in political interest is explained by differences across country-sessions and 87% 
of the variance in political interest results from differences in respondents within countries. 
Similarly, 12% of the variance in trust in parliament is due to country-level differences 
whereas 88% of the variance is attributable to the individual level.   
We also found that the predictors at the country level help explain 59% of the variance in 
political interest across country-sessions. By contrast, the country-level predictors help 
explain only 5% of variance of trust in parliament across country-sessions.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
7 The models presented are OLS models. We also ran Hierarchical Ordered Logit models and obtained results 
similar to the ones presented here. For ease of interpretation we present the Hierarchical Linear models. The 
Ordered Logit models are available upon request from the authors.    
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Table 1: 2 level models (political interest and confidence in parliament) 
 Parameter Political Interest 
β (P-value) 
Trust in 
Parliament β (P-
value) 
Fixed Effects 
 Intercept 2.280 (<0.001) 2.261 (<0.001) 
 Selectorate -0.087 (0.129) -0.016 (0.839) 
 Decentralization 0.086 (0.146) 0.011 (0.842) 
 AVDM -0.015 (0.043) -0.018 (0.005) 
 AVDM^2 0.000 (0.023) 0.000 (0.002) 
 SMD 0.664 (<0.001) 0.152 (0.028) 
 Mixed Systems 0.540 (<0.001) 0.156 (0.172) 
 Strong Preferential List 
Systems 
0.009 (0.941) 0.031 (0.741) 
 Weak Preferential List 
Systems 
0.163 (0.313) 0.028 (0.810) 
 No pool at party level 
systems 
0.062 (0.522) -0.151 (0.333) 
 GDP/Capita 0.000 (<0.001) 0.000 (0.023) 
 Gallagher Index -0.022 (0.034) -0.006 (0.576) 
 New-democracy -0.009 (0.916) 0.011 (0.911) 
 Age 0.001 (0.286) 0.002 (<0.001) 
 Gender -0.270 (<0.001) -0.025 (0.017) 
Variance Components 
 Intercept 0.222 (<0.001) 0.297 (<0.001) 
 Residual 0.875 0.830 
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Clearly, the assertion that intra-party candidate selection process affects the electorate's 
political interest or their level of trust in parliament does not gain support. Specifically, 
whereas as we discussed in the previous section, scholars and mainly politicians argue that 
democratizing candidate selection processes should have a positive effect on the electorate 
since political parties will be perceived as more open and democratized; since voters' 
efficacy levels will increase; since their interest in the political process will be deepened due 
to the intensified competition among candidates within parties; our analysis does not 
provide support for this ‘common wisdom’. Neither the selectorate nor the degree of 
decentralization of selection processes seem to affect any of our outcome variables.  
To further validate these results we also ran the analysis using a treatment contrast to the 
ordered selectorate and decentralization variables, effectively regarding them as categorical 
variables. This operationalization also used the modal category of the variable to aggregate 
it from the party to the country-session level, and not the weighted average as presented in 
the table. We corroborate the conclusion that neither selectorate nor decentralization levels 
affect trust in parliament, and that decentralization does not affect political interest as well. 
With regards to selectorate, we do find that, controlling for levels of decentralization, levels 
of interest in politics is significantly higher in countries where the modal category of 
selection is delegates compared to those living in countries in which the modal category of 
selection processes is primaries (contrary to expectations). No statistically significant effect 
was detected when comparing selection via a small group of leaders and selection via 
primaries.  
Lastly, we also examined the effect of selection and decentralization by re-running the 
analysis with a dichotomous variable that differentiates between countries with a modal 
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category of primaries compared to all other countries. We indeed find, in accordance with 
H1, that in countries with modal category of party primaries people are more interested in 
politics than in other countries. Such an effect was not detected with regards to trust in 
parliament.   
The results concerning the effect of electoral systems are interesting. As mentioned, we use 
three different variables to tab into the various mechanisms that might explain the effect of 
electoral systems on political interest and trust in parliament.  
To begin with, we controlled for district magnitude (M hereafter) and anticipated a 
curvilinear relationship between M and the outcome variables (we added the squared term 
of M). Theoretically, we hypothesized that when district magnitudes are low (=1), voters feel 
they have direct access to their representative in parliament, which should increase levels of 
interest in politics as well as levels of trust in parliament. Moreover, holding that 
representative accountable is easy enough (clarity of responsibility is high), which in turn, 
might increase citizens' levels of trust in the legislature. On the other hand, in systems with 
very large district magnitudes the electoral map is characterized by multiple parties that 
compete vigorously and energetically and hence might entice voters and encourage them to 
be interested in the political competition. In the middle range of district magnitude we 
hypothesize levels of interest and trust to be the lowest (compared to the two extremes). As 
can be seen from the results, these theoretical expectations gain support for both outcome 
variables. Specifically,  When M is very low (1), political interest and trust in parliament are 
at their highest. As district magnitude increases the levels of trust in parliament and political 
interest decreases, but the relationships are slightly convex and at some point as district 
magnitude increases so does the level of interest and trust in parliament.    
23 
 
Our second measure of electoral system is Lundell and Karvonen's preferential voting 
variable. We use a treatment contrast with Closed List PR as a reference group. We find that 
respondents who live in countries with Single Member District electoral systems have higher 
levels of political interest as well as level of trust in parliament. In other words, in SMD 
systems when the ability to hold politicians accountable is maximized, and when voters feel 
they have a direct representation, voters tend to have more positive attitudes compared to 
Closed List PR systems (controlling for district magnitude). Thus, respondents in SMD 
systems are more interested in politics by 0.664 (out of a 4 point scale) compared to 
respondents in CLPR countries. The substantive effect of SMD with regards to trust in 
parliaments is smaller (0.156) although still statistically significant. Similarly, in Mixed 
member Electoral Systems, we see higher levels of interest compared to CLPR systems at a 
statistically significant level. All other electoral systems do not differ in their levels of trust 
and interest compared to Closed List PR systems.  
Lastly, we incorporated Gallagher's index of disproportionally. Recall that higher values of 
the Gallagher index indicate disproportional systems. We find that controlling for district 
magnitude and the various electoral systems, in countries with greater disproportionality 
respondents tend to have lower levels of political interest, yet disproportionality does not 
seem to affect levels of trust in parliament.8  All in all it seems the analysis of electoral 
systems effect reveals that respondents in SMD systems enjoy high levels of trust and 
interest in politics compared to PR systems. But controlling for this effect, respondents from 
                                                             
8  We also ran specifications of the model in which we did not include the Gallagher Index, the District 
Magnitude and the Preferential variables one at a time. The substantive results of other covariates remained 
the same. Moreover, we also used an 8 point categorical variable of electoral system, as well as  a dichotomous 
variable that differentiates proportional electoral systems versus plurality/majoritarian systems and the results 
remained the same to the ones presented above.      
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countries with greater disproportionality, show lower levels of political interest. Lastly, 
district magnitude exhibit a convex relationship with both outcome variables9.  
Despite the fact that most variation in our outcome variable is attributable to individual level 
factors, our individual level predictors of age and gender explain only 2.5% of the variance in 
political interest and barely explain 1% of the variance in the trust in parliament outcome 
variable. As explained above, issues of data availability prohibited us from incorporating 
more individual level predictors that have been shown to affect political attitudes (such as 
education and income levels, political sophistication, and strength of party identification10).    
Nonetheless, with regards to the individual predictors we see that, as theory tells us, women 
are less interested in politics and trust parliament to a lesser extent than men. In addition, it 
                                                             
9 Corruption levels have been hypothesized and shown to influence political interest and trust in parliament 
(Van der Meer, 2010). Incorporating data on political corruption using Transparency International's Corruption 
Perception Index decreases the number of observations from 67,000 to 54,000 and the number of country-
sessions from 46 to 39, for the political interest models, and decrease the number of observations from 76,000 
to 65,000 and the number of country-sessions from 55 to 49 for the trust in parliament model. When adding 
CPI to the political interest model we find, as predicted, that respondents in countries with lower levels of 
corruption enjoy higher levels of interest. The effect of GDP and the individual level predictors (age and gender) 
remained the same. Interestingly, the convex effect of district magnitude disappears and so does the effect of 
levels of disproportionality. Nonetheless, we continue to find support that citizens under SMD systems enjoy 
higher level of interest compared to people in PR systems. In addition, whereas decentralization of selection 
processes continues not to affect political interest, under the CPI model the scope of the selectorate gains 
significance but in the opposite direction to the one hypothesized: people from countries that use on average 
more democratized and larger selectorates actually are less interested in politics compared to people from 
countries with more restrictive selectorates. Just as in the political interest model, adding corruption levels as a 
control in the political trust model makes the effect of district magnitude as well as disproportionality 
disappear. Yet, just as before we continue to find a significant positive difference in trust between people who 
live in SMD countries to their counterparts who live in PR countries. Neither selectorate nor decentralization 
seems to affect trust in parliament, and new democracies continue to enjoy similar levels of trust to old 
democracies, controlling for all other factors in the model. Interestingly, adding the corruption control makes 
the effect of GDP per capita disappear such that no longer do we find that richer countries enjoy higher levels 
of trust compared to less developed countries. This is probably due to the strong positive correlation between 
corruption levels and GDP per capita.       
10 We also ran the analysis with an additional individual level covariate of education. Adding this covariate 
decreases the number of individual level observations as well as country-sessions. At the individual level adding 
education decreased the number of observations in the political interest model from around 67,000 to 35,500. 
This decreased was from around 76,000 to 50,000 in the confidence in parliament model. The country-sessions 
were reduced from 46 to 25 in the political interest model and from 55 to 36 in the trust in parliament model. 
Educated people tend to have higher levels of political interest and trust in parliament all else being equal. 
Other individual level as well as country-session level predictors continues to exhibited similar effects to the 
ones presented in Table 1 (although a robust standard error model could not be estimated and some of the 
variables thus fail to gain statistical significance. Nonetheless the directionality of the estimated coefficient was 
similar to the ones presented in Table 1).  
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seems older people tend to trust parliament but the effect of age on political interest is not 
statistically significant (when using log of age to account for its skewness, we get a significant 
positive effect of age on both political interest as well as trust in parliament).   
 
Conclusion 
In this paper we seek to empirically test whether democratized candidate selection 
processes affect citizens' political attitudes. It has been widely claimed by politicians and the 
media, as well as by some scholars that opening candidate selection procedures would result 
in higher levels of trust in parties and other institutions that include them like governments 
and parliaments, and that citizens' levels of efficacy, participation and interest in politics 
would increase. These reasons were sometimes quoted by politicians when debating which 
candidate selection method to adopt. However, to date it seems no comprehensive cross-
national analysis was conducted to verify whether indeed more inclusive and decentralized 
selection processes are associated with positive citizens' attitudes. Our paper seeks to 
amend this lacuna.   
Looking at two outcome variables - political interest and trust in parliament - and using a 2 
level varying-intercept hierarchical model we show that the ‘common wisdom’ that 
democratized candidate selection processes foster greater interest and trust is largely a 
myth. Whereas other country-level as well as individual-level predictors affect political 
interest and trust in parliament in similar ways to the ones found in the literature, the effect 
of selectorate and decentralization is not apparent. Only with the most simplistic 
differentiation between countries in which the modal selectorate is via primaries and all 
other countries, do we find support that citizens in the former countries were more 
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interested in politics compared to respondents from the latter countries. Yet, this effect was 
not apparent with regards to levels of trust in parliament.  
One of the major issues we encounter when working on this project concerns data 
availability and comparability. To begin with, data on candidate selection processes is scarce 
and hard to come by. Therefore, our dataset was initially restricted to only those parties and 
consequently country-sessions for which we found data on intra-party selection methods. 
Second, as the table in the appendix reveals we could not obtain data on either of our 
outcome variables for all 67 country-sessions. In fact, our dataset for the political interest 
model includes 46 country-sessions and for the trust in parliament model contains only 55 
country-sessions. Moreover, obviously no one survey contains data for all the country-
sessions we examine. Thus, we have to use several survey sources, each of which might have 
minor differences in question wording or scales used. When needed we re-scaled the 
variables to facilitate comparability across the surveys (as described in the paper). However, 
we cannot overcome the pitfall of question wording, and hope these minor differences do 
not bias the results.  
Third, while the prevalent literature specifies numerous hypotheses on the effect of 
individual level predictors on political attitudes (such as income, participation, political 
sophistication and efficacy) limitations on data availability prevent us from testing these 
effects. We simply cannot gather a large enough dataset that contains information for these 
individual level predictors, as many survey sources neglect to ask respondents about one 
indicator or the other. Therefore, although our analysis reveals that most of the variance in 
political interest and trust in parliaments is attributable to the individual level, we only 
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examine two individual level covariates (age and gender), which in turn explain only a 
limited portion of that variance.  
Lastly, in order to truly mimic the data generating process that gives rise to the data, we 
should have estimated a 3 level hierarchical model whereby individual respondents are 
nested within the parties they identify with, which in turn are nested within country-
sessions. Under this specification, our main predictors - selectorate and decentralization - 
would have been measured at their appropriate party-level, whereas other predictors would 
still be measured at individual and country levels respectively. This more elaborate model 
would have enabled us to account for variation in political attitudes across individuals, 
parties, and countries. However, as was explained in the paper, issues of data limitations do 
not enable us to estimate such models.   
To continue exploring whether candidate selection processes affect citizens' political 
attitudes we are going to extend the analysis and examine other outcome variables. As can 
be seen from the table in the appendix, we intend to study whether and how intra-party 
candidate selections impact citizens' levels of trust in parties themselves, their trust in 
government and their overall satisfaction with and support for democracy. We hope this 
comprehensive analysis will help shed light on whether democratizing candidate selection 
procedures bear positive effects on citizens' attitudes and thus help both scholars as well as 
politicians in understanding the advantages and drawbacks of every type of selection 
processes.  
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Appendix   
Overview of operationalization outcome variables 
Interest in politics 
 
‘How interested would you say you are in politics?’ 
 
1. Very interested 
2. Somewhat/Fairly interested 
3. Not very interested 
4. Not at all interested 
99    Don’t know/didn’t answer/missing 
 
Trust in government 
 
‘I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much 
confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not 
very much confidence or none at all?’ 
 
    1 A great deal 
    2 Quite a lot 
    3 Not very much 
    4 None at all 
    99 Don’t know/didn’t answer/missing 
 
Trust in political parties 
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    1 A great deal 
    2 Quite a lot 
    3 Not very much 
    4 None at all 
    99 Don’t know/didn’t answer/missing 
 
Trust in parliament 
 
    1 A great deal 
    2 Quite a lot 
    3 Not very much 
    4 None at all 
    99 Don’t know/didn’t answer/missing 
 
Support for democracy 
 
‘I'm going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic political 
system. Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly, 
after I read each one of them?’ 
 
Democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other form of government 
 
1 Agree strongly 
2 Agree 
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3 Disagree 
4 Strongly disagree 
99 Don’t know/didn’t answer/missing 
 
Satisfaction with democracy 
 ‘On the whole are you very satisfied, rather satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied 
with the way democracy is developing in our country?’ 
1 Very satisfied 
2 Rather/fairly satisfied 
3 Not very satisfied 
4 Not at all satisfied 
99 Don’t know/didn’t answer/missing 
List of outcome variables and their data sources in public opinion surveys 
Response Variable Data source 
Interest in Politics WVS, EVS, Afrobarometer, Latin Barometer, ESS, 
Itanes 
Trust in Government WVS, EVS 
Trust in Political Parties WVS, EVS, ESS, Afrobarometer, Latin Barometer 
Trust in Parliament WVS, EVS, Afrobarometer, Latin Barometer, CSES, 
CNEP, ESS 
Support for democracy WVS, EVS, Afrobarometer, Latin Barometer, CSES, 
CNEP 
Satisfaction with 
democracy 
EVS, CSES, ESS, CNEP, Afrobarometer, Latin 
Barometer 
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List of country-sessions 
 
Country Session Pol_interest Trust_gov Trust_part Trust_parl satisf_dem support_dem 
Argentina 2005 X X X X    
Argentina 1999 X X X X X X 
Argentina 1993 X X X X  X 
Australia 1996     X   
Australia 2004 X X X X X X 
Austria 1990 X   X    
Austria 1996 X   X X X 
Belgium 1995 X   X X X 
Botswana 2002    X X   
Botswana 2004    X X   
Brazil 2002 X X X X X   
Canada 1997     X   
Canada 1988 X   X    
Chile 1997 X X X X X X 
Chile 2001 X  X X X   
Chile 1989 X X X X    
Croatia 1997    X X X 
Czech Republic 1996 X X X X X X 
Czech Republic 1998 X   X X X 
Costa Rica 2002 X  X X X   
Denmark 1990 X   X    
Denmark 1998    X X X 
Finland 1995 X X X X  X 
Finland 1999 X   X X X 
Finland 2003 X X X X X X 
France 1981 X   X    
Ghana 2000    X X   
Germany 1987 X   X    
Greece 1990 X    X   
Hungary 1990 X   X    
Hungary 1998 X   X X X 
Iceland 1983 X   X    
Iceland 1987 X   X    
Ireland 1989 X   X    
Ireland 1997 X  X X X X 
Ireland 2002     X X 
Israel 2003     X X 
Israel 1996     X   
Israel 1999 X   X X   
Italy 1968 X       
Italy 1979 X   X    
Italy 1987 X   X    
Japan 1990 X   X    
Japan 1993 X X X X  X 
Japan 1996     X   
Kenya 2002    X X   
Mexico 1994 X X X X  X 
Mexico 2003 X X X X    
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Netherlands 1981 X   X    
New Zealand 1990 X       
New Zealand 1993 X       
New Zealand 2002 X X X X X X 
Nicaragua 2000 X  X X X   
Norway 1981 X   X    
Norway 1989 X   X    
Norway 1993 X X X X  X 
Norway 1997     X   
Norway 2001 X   X X X 
Poland 1997 X X X X X X 
Spain 1979 X   X    
Spain 1993 X X X X  X 
South Africa 1999 X X X X X X 
Sweden 1994 X X X X  X 
Sweden 1998    X X X 
Switzerland 1999 X   X X   
UK 1997 X   X X X 
Russia 1999         X   
 
 
